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[Crim. No. 11947. In Bank. July 16, 1968.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GARY LYNN 
MARSHALL, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Arrest-Without Warrant-Making Arrest-Making Known 
Official Character.-By persistently knocking, demanding en-
try, and identifying themselves for several minutes before 
picking a lock and entering an apartment in which they had 
reasonable grounds to believe an arrestee to be, police officers 
substantially complied with the notice requirements of Pen. 
Code, § 844, providing that to make an arrest, a peace officer 
may break open the door or window of the house in which the 
officer has reasonable grounds for believing the person to be 
arrested to be, after having demanded admittance, and explain-
ing the purpose for which it is desired. 
[2] Id.-Without Warrant-Making Arrest-Making Known Of-
ficial Character.-In a marijuana prosecution, substantial evi-
dence supported the trial court's finding that police officers 
reasonably believed that defendant was in an apartment which 
they forcibly entered, where an informant had so advised 
them, where, although after the informant returned and be-
fore the officers entered they did not eonstantly watch the 
apartment, the informant had told them that defendant was 
planning to leave to attend a party, and the apartment was 
dark and quiet, there was testimony that the apartment en-
trance was visible from the squad car and that one or more 
officers were always in the car before the entry; where the 
informant did not tell the officers when defendant was plan-
ning to leave and they saw no one leave the apartment which 
was dark when they first arrived as well as when they 
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Rev., Arrest, § 49; Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 87 
et seq. 
ldcK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Arrest, § 14; [3] Searches and 
Seizures, § 41; [4, 9, ]3] Searches and Seizures, § 29; [5] Searches 
and Seizures, § 20; [6] Searches and Seizures, § 6; [7, 8] Searches 
and Seizures, §36; [10] S('ar(·1-(,8 and Seizures, §24; [11, 12] 
Searches and Seizures, § 28; [14] Poisons, § 15(3). 
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52 PEOPLE 1). MARSHALL [69 C.2d 
entered it; and where the officers believed that defendant was 
hiding inside. 
[S] Searches and Seizures-Remedies for Wrongful Search and 
Seizure-Burden of Proof.-The burden of proof is on the 
prosecution to justify a seizure of evidence without a warrant. 
[4] Id.-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest-Search of Prem-
ises.-During a lawful search of premises for persons believed 
to be in hiding, police officers may seize contraband evidence 
"in plain sight." 
[5] lel. - Without Warrant - What Constitutes Unreasonable 
Search.-However strongly convinced police officers may be 
that a search will reveal contraband, their belief, whether 
based on a sense of smell or other sources, does not justify a 
search without a warrant; thus a search withont warrant by 
police officers lawfully on a premises in connection with an 
arrest was not justified by the odor of marijuana emanating 
from a closed brown paper bag that was in an open box in an 
open closet, nor was the marijuana in plain view of the officer 
to justify its seizure, wherc it was in cellophane-type bags 
thllt were in the paper bag. 
[6] Id.-Investigations Falling Short of Search.-When officers 
seek to justify a seizure without a warrant on the ground that 
no search was involved, the objects 80 seized must have been 
in the. plain view of an officer who had a right to be in the 
position to have that view, and must have been "fully dis-
closed and open to the eye and hand." 
[7] ld.-Without Warrant-Seizure of Evidentiary Matter-When 
Search Warrant Required.-A plain view of simply suspicious 
looking or unusual objects does not justify their seizure with-
out a warrant; thus a search of a brown paper bag was re-
quired to disclose its contents, though there was the odor of 
marijuana emanating therefrom, lllaking a search warrant 
necessary before the marijuana could be seized, where the 
paper bag itself was not contraband, where it was inherently 
impossible for the contents of the bag to be in plain view, 
and where only by prying into its hidden interior could the 
police officer be sure that he was seizing contraband and noth-
[8] 
\ 
ing more. 
Id.-Without Warrant-Seizure of Evidentiary Matter-Iden-
tification by Smell.-"In plain. smell" is not the equivalent of 
"in plllin view," and in making a search without warr~nt, al-
though officers may rely on their sense of smell to confirm 
their observation of already visible contraband, however keen 
their sense of smell, they cannot seize the thing they smell 
until they find it after looking for and through the places 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Searches and Seizures, § 43. 
) 
July 1968] PEOPLE V. MARSHALL 
(68 C.2d 51: 68 Cal.Rptr. 585. 442 P.2d 685] 
53 
from which the odor emanates, a search which they may not 
conduct without a warrant. 
[9] Id.-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest-Search of Prem-
ises.-In a marijuana prosecution, the pl'osecution failed to 
llleet its burden of proving that the seizure uf 111/1 rijuana was 
lawfully made in the course of a search for sU>!P('cts, where 
the J'ecord failed to show that it was discovered in the course 
of a search of an apartment for suspects in hiding rather than 
in the course of a general search for evidence after it was 
known that the suspects were absent. 
[10] Id.-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest.-A search is not 
incident to an arrest when it is conducted at a place remote 
from the arrest. 
[11] Id.-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest-Time of Search 
With Respect to Arrest.-To be valid as incident to an arrest, 
a search without warrant must be "contemporaneous" or "sub-
stantially contemporaneous" with the arrest. 
[12] Id.-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest-Time of Search 
With Respect to Arrest.-A search that is substantially con-
temporaneous with arrest may precede the arrest, so long as 
tbere is probable cause to arrest at the outset of the search; 
but no such justification exists where defendant was neither 
present at the place of seal'ch nor arrested until several hours 
after the search. (Disapproving, to the extent they are con-
trary to the conclusion herein, People v. Luna, 155 Cal.App.2d 
493 l318 P.2d 116]; People v. Williams, 189 Cal.App.2d 29 
[11 Cal.Rptr. 43]; People v. Vice, 147 Cal.App.2d 269 [305 
P.2d 270], and People v. Dominguez, 144 Cal.App.2d 63 
[300 P.2d 194].) 
[IS] Id.-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest-Search of Prem-
ises.-When officers went to an apartment to make an arrest 
and ascertained that no one was in the apartment, they could 
not legally search it without a warrant where there was no 
question of violence, no movable "ehicle was involved, nor 
was there an arrest or imminent destruction, removal, or con-
cealment of the property intended to be seized, and where 
there was no probability of material change in the situation 
during a time necessary to secure a warrant which the officers 
made no move to do, although time permitted it, 
[14] Poisons-01fenses and Prosecutions-Weight and Sufficiency 
of Evidence-Unlawful Possession.-In a prosecution for pos-
session of marijuana for sale resulting in a conviction of the 
lesser o1fense of possession, the erroneous admission into evi-
dence over defendant's objection of a cache of marijuana found 
[14] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 47; Am.Jur.2d, 
Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons, § 46. 
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and unconstitutionally seized in bis apartment was error which 
contributed to his conviction requiring reversal, where without 
that evidence defendant could not have been convicted of the 
charge of possession for sale, and where the other evidence, 
consisting solely of a small 'luantity of marijuana allegedly 
obtained from uefendnnt by :m informant whose reliability 
was not established, whose 1II0vements the police officers ad-
mittedly could not observe without interruption, and whose 
information was corroborated only by illegally obtained evi-
dence, was not sufficient, in itself, to support the conviction. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange 
County. William S. Lee, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for possession of marijuana. Judgment of con-
viction reversed. 
Daniel L. Schlegel, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assi<;tant Attorney General, and Rose-Marie Gruenwald, Dep-
uty Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant was cllarged by iuformation 
with possession of marijuulla for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11530.5). He appeals from a judgment of conviction of the 
lesser included offense of possession of marijuana (Health & 
Sa!. Code, § 11530) entered after a trial by a judge without a 
jury. 
At 7 :45 on Sunday evening, October 30, 1966, four police 
officers in an unmarked police car arrived at a vantage point 
across the street from defendant'l> apartment in Huntington 
Beach. They sent an informant to purchase marijuana from 
one Mathews, l who shared the apartment with defendant. At 
8 :15 the informant returned with marijuana in a cellophane-
ty~e bag and told tIle officers that defendant gave it to him 
free of charge. He also told them that the transaction took 
place in the bedroom and that the marijuana he was given 
was taken from a brown paper bag that contained more cello-
phane-type bags of marijuana. 
The officers had neither an arrest warrant nor a search war-
rant, but decided to arrest defendant on the basis of the 
lMathew8, a codefendant at thc tl'ial, was also convicted of pOSSessiOD 
of marijuana, but has not appealed. 
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informant's report, Because the front door was a large sliding 
glass door, they ruled out forcible entry as dangerous to per-
son and property. When they could not find the apartment 
house manager to get a key to the door, they called the police 
department for an officer to pick the lock. A.n officer equipped 
to do so arrived at 8 :30. 
The officers knocked on the door several times, announced 
their identity, and demanded entry. There was no response. 
They then picked the lock, and at 8 :40 entered the apartment 
with their guns drawn. They found no one in the apartment 
after a cursory search of the living room, the bedroom, and 
the bathroom. An open window with its screen removed indi-
cated that the occupants had fled. One officer detected a sweet 
odor similar to that of the marijuana defendant had given the 
informant. In other narcotics investigations the officer had 
smelled similar odors from marijuana that had been soaked in 
wine. The odor came from an open cardboard box on the floor 
inside an open bedroom closet. In the box the officers found a 
closed brown paper bag, which, when opened, was found to 
contain 21 plastic b1!-gs of wine-soaked, sweet-smelling mari-
juana. 
The officers then made a thorough search of the apartment 
until approximately 9 :30 p.m., but found no other contraband. 
They remained in the apartment to await the occupants' 
return. They arrested Mathews upon his return shortly before 
11 p.m. and arrested defendant upon his return about 1 :30 
a.m. 
Defendant contends that the trial court conunitted prejudi-
cial error in admitting the cache of marijuana into evidence 
over his objection that it was illegally obtained. He urges that 
the officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe that he 
was present in the apartment when they entered it and that 
since their entry was therefore illegal, the evidence was neces-
sarily obtained illegally. (People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Ca1.2d 
586 [63 Cal.Rptr. 10,432 P.2d 706].) 
Penal Code section 844 provides that "To make an arrest 
... a peace officer, may break open the door or window of the 
house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which [the 
officer has] reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after 
having demanded admittance and explained the purpose 
for which admittance is desired." [1] By persistently 
knocking, demanding entry, and identifying themselves for 
several minutes before picking the lock and enterillg, the offi-
cers sUbstantially complied with the notice requirements of 
56 PEOPLE V. MARSHALL [69 C.2d 
the statute. (See People v. Rosales (1968) 68 Cal.2d 299, 
302 [66 Ca1.Rptr. 1, 437 P.2d 489] ; People v. Limon (1967) 
255 Ca1.App.2d 519, 522 [63 Cal.Rptr. 91].) [2] More-
over, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding 
that the officers reasonably believed that defendant was in the 
apartment. It is true that after the informant returned and 
before the officers entered they did not constantly watch the 
apartment; that the informant had told them that defendant 
was planning to leave to attend a party; and that the apart-
ment was dark and quiet. There was testimony, however, that 
the apartment entrance was visible from the squad car, and 
that one or more officers were always in the car before the 
entry. The informant did not tell the officers when defendant 
was planning to leave, and they saw 110 one leave the apart-
ment, which was dark when the officers first arrived at the 
apartment as well as when they entered it. The officers 
believed that defendant was hiding inside, and the trial court 
could properly find that their belief was reasonable under the 
circumstances. Their entry therefore complied with section 
844. ' 
[3] The burden remains on the prosecution, however, to 
justify a seizure of evidence without a warrant. (People v. 
Burke (1964) 61 Cal.2d 575, 578 [39 Cal.Rptr. 531, 394 P.2d 
67]; Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 486 [11 L.Ed. 
2d 856, 858, 84 S.Ct. 889].) The Attorney General contends 
that although in fact no one was in the apartment, the officers 
could constitutionally seize the cache of marijuana in the 
course of a search of the apartment for the persons they rea-
sonably believed to be therein. 
[4] During a lawful search of premises for persons 
believed to be in hiding, police officers may seize contraband _ j 
evidence" in plain sight" (People v. Roberts (1956) 47 Cal. I 
2d 374, 379 [303 P.2d 721] ; People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal. I' 
2d 690, 707 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365] [reversed on 
other grounds].) Under such circumstances there is, in fact, , 
no search for evidence. (See Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. . 
23, 43 [10 L.Ed.2d 726, 743, 83 S.Ct. 1623] ; United States v. 
Rabinowitz (1950) 339 U.S. 56, 75 [94 L.Ed. 653, 665, 70 
S.Ct.430] (dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter).) 
[5] In the present case the marijuana was not in plain 
sight. It was in cellophane-type bags that were in a closed 
brown paper bag that was in an open box in an open closet. 
The Attorney General contends that by virtue of the odor and 
the iuformant'l:I report that the marijuana he was given came 
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from a brown paper bag, the officer had reason to believe that 
the brown paper bag contained marijuana. He concludes that 
the marijuana should therefore be deemed to have been ill 
plain view of the officer. 
This contention overlooks the difference between probable 
cause to believe contraband will be found, which justifies the 
issuance of a search warrant, and observation of contraband 
in plain sight, which justifies seizure without a warrant. How-
ever strongly convinced officers may be that a search will 
reveal contraband, their belief, whether based on the sense of 
smell or other sources, does 110t justify a search without a 
warrant. " 'The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often 
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual infercnccs which rcasoll-
able. men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in 
requiring that those inferences bc drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime [2]. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a 
magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search 
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a 
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave 
the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police 
officers.''' (Chapman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 610, 
614-615 [5 L.Ed.2d 828, 832-833, 81 S.Ct. 776], quoting from 
Johnson v. United States (1948) 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 [92 L.Ed. 
436,439-440, 68 S.Ct. 367] ; see Jones v. United States (1958) 
357 U.S. 493, 497 [2 L.Ed.2d 1514, 1518, 78 S.Ct. 1253]; 
United States v. Mullin (4th Cir. 1964) 329 F.2d 295,297.) 
[6] When officers seek to justify a seizure without a war-
2It is this point that is also not grasped by the dissenting opiuion 
bcrcin. Tbat opinion completely ignores the rule that in the absence of 
80me "grave emergency" (McDonald v. United States (1948) 33:> U.~. 
451, 455 [93 L.Ed. 153, 158, 69 S.Ct. 191]) a search of a dwelling cannot 
be conducted without a warrant except as incident to a lawful arrest 
therein. (Chapman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 610, 613 [5 L.Ed.2d 
828, 831, 81 S.Ct. 776].) Of course there is no dispute with the many 
cases cited in the dissenting opinion that :lll officer may rely upon all 
of his senses in determining whether there is probable cause to belie\'c 
t.hat a crime has been committed or that contraband may be present. 
Probable cause alone, however, cannot justify a search without a warrant. 
" 'Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in 
a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a seareh of that place 
without a warrant. And such searches are •.. unlawful notwithstanding 
facts unquestionably showing probable cause.'" (Chapman v. United 
States, S'Upra, quoting Agnello v. United States (1!-l2ii) 269 U.S. 20, 33 
[70 L.Ed. 145, 149, 46 S.Ct. 4, 51 A.L.R. 409].) 
I 
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rant on the ground that no search was involved, the objects so 
seized must havc been" in the plain view of an officer who has 
a right to be in the position to have that vicw ... " (Harris 
v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 234, 236 [19 L.Ed.2d 1067, 
1069, 88 S.Ot. 992, 993] ), and must have been" fully disclosed 
and open to the eye and hand." (State v. Quinn (1918) 111 
S.O. 174, 180 [97 S.E. 62, 64, 3 A.L.R. 1500] ; see also Davis v. 
United States (9th Oir. 1964) 327 F.2d 301, 305; United 
Stales V. Barone (2d Oir. 1964) 330 F.2d 543, 544; Hiet V. 
Um:ted States (D.O. Oir. 1967) 372 F.2d 911, 912; People V. 
Kampmann (1968) 258 Oal.App.2d 529, 531 [65 Oal.Rptr. 
798]: People V. Lees (1967) 257 Oal.App.2d 363, 368 [64 
Cal.Rptr. 888]; People V. Allison (1967) 249 Oal.App.2d 653, 
656 [57 Oal.Rptr. 635J; People V. Mandola (1967) 249 Oal. 
App.2d 599, 604 [57 Oal.Rptr. 737J ; People V. Jolke (1966) 
242 Oal.App.2d 132, 148 [51 Oal.Rptr. 171J ; People V. Davis 
(1961) 188 Ca1.App.2d 718, 723 [10 Oal.Rptr. 610J.) . I 
[7] A plain view of simply suspicious looking or unusual 
objects does not justify their seizure without a warrant. 
Thus in California V. Hurst (9th Oir. 1963) 325 F.2d 891, 898-
899 (reversed on other grounds (1965) 381 U.S. 760 [14 
L.Ed.2d 713, 85, 8.0t. 1796J), the court held a seizure 
illegal, stating: "All that was in plain view was a large brown 
package about six inches inside the exposed vent hole. Upon 
reaching into the vent hole and removing the package [the 
officer J observed that the package consisted of two brown 
paper bags which covered two plastic bags which, in turn, 
covered a pillowcase. The officer then felt the pillowcase and 
noted the weedy, leafy feel of the contents. There can be no 
claim that the feeling of the pillowcase occurred in a "plain 
view" observation since the pillowcase itself was surrounded 
by four outer wrappings, all of which were rolled into a cylin-
drical shape. But only upon feeling the contents of the pillow-
case d,id officer Hanks shout that he had' found the stuff.' " 
(Italics in original.) In United States V. Vallos (D. Wyo. 
1926) 17 F.2d 390, the court found that officers illegally con-
ducted a search when they saw suspicious looking lumps under 
a small ru~, removed the rug, and discovered packages done 
up in burlap in the way contraband liquor was commonly 
wrapped. Although one of the packages was open, no liquor 
was visible until the officers took hold of the package and a 
bottle dropped out. 
In the present case the brown paper bag itself was not 
contraband. Only by prying into its hidden interior (see Bie-
July 1968) PEOPLE t'. MARSHALL 59 
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Zicki v. Supe/'ior Cou/·t (1962) 57 Cal.2d 602, 605 [21 Cal. 
Rptr. 552, 371 P.2d 288]) could the officer be sure that he was 
seizing contraband and nothing more. 'fhe fact that the con-
tainer was only a brown paper bag instead of a pa,cking box, 
purse, handbag, briefcase, hatbox, snuffbox, trunk, desk, or 
chest of drawers (see People v. Roberts, supra, 47 Cal.2d 374, 
378-379) is immaterial. It is inherently impossible for the con-
tents of a closed opaque container to be in plain view regard-
less of the size of the container or the material it is made of. 
A search of the container is necessary to disclose its contents. 
A search demands a search warrant. 
[8] Of course officers may rely on their sense of smell to 
confirm their observation of already visible contraband. (See 
People v. Foote (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 860, 865 [24 Cal.Rptr. 
752] ; People v. Chong Wing Louie (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 
167, 170 [307 P.2d 929] ; People v. Bennett (1967) 28 App. 
Div.2d 526 [280 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259].) To hold, however, that 
an odor, either alone or with other evidence of invisible con-
tents can be deemed the same as or corollary to plain view, 
would open the door to snooping and rummaging through 
personal effects. Even a most acute sense of smell might mis-
lead officers into fruitless invasions of privacy where no con-
traband is found. 
Moreover, however keen their sense of smell, officers cannot 
seize the thing they smell until they find it after looking for 
and through the places from which the odor emanates. In 
short, they must still conduct a search. They may not do so 
without a warrant any more than without a warrant they may 
set loose a dog of unerring talent to sniff out contraband they 
reasonably believe will be found merely because they have 
lawfully entered the premises for another purpose. "In plain 
smell, " therefore, is plainly not the equivalent of "in pla.in 
view." 
[9] Moreover, even had the marijuana been discovered in 
plain view, the record fails to show that it was discovered in 
the course of a search of the apartment for suspects in hiding 
rather than in the course of a general search for evidence. 
"Assuming that the warrantless entry into the apartment wa~ 
justified by the need immediately to search for the suspect, 
the issue remains whether the subsequent search was reason-
ably supported by those same exigent circumstances. If the 
. envelope were come upon in the course of a search for the 
suspect, the answer might be different from that where it is 
come upon, even though in plain view, in the course of a 
.. ~ 
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general, indiseriminate seareh of closets, dressers, ete., after it 
is known that the occupant is abseut." (Gilbert v. California 
(1967) 388 U.R. 263, 274-27;") [18 hEd.2d 1178, 11R7-1188, 87 
S.Ct. 1951] (Appendix to majority opinion).) There was tes-
timony that the officer identified the closet as the source of the 
odor when he entered the bedroom searching it for suspects. 
The testimony specifically directed to this issue, however, con-
sisb; solely of the following colloquy between the prosecuting 
attorney and the officer who made the seizure: 
"Q : Were you satisfied, Officer Epstein, that there was 
nobody in that bedroom before you found the sack containing 
marijuana' 
"A: Yes. 
"Q: It was after you were satisfied there was nobody there 
that you found the saek Y 
" A : Yes." We must conclude, therefore, that the prosecu-
tion failed to meet its burden of proving that the seizure was 
lawfully made in the course of a search for suspect.<>. Indeed, 
the prosecution requested no finding of fact on this issue, and 
at the trial argued that the seizure was legal on the sole 
ground that it was incident to the subsequent arrest. (See 
People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Ca1.2d 418, 428 [67 Ca1.Rptr. 
409, 439 P.2d 321] ; Giordenello v. United States (1958) 357 
U.S. 480, 488 [2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 1510,78 S.Ct. 1245].) 
The seizure cannot be upheld upon that ground, however. 
[10] A search is not incident to an arrest when it is con-
ducted at a place remote from the arrest (see Stoner v. Cali-
form'a, supra, 376 U.S. 483,486 [11 L.Ed.2d 856, 858] : People 
v. King (1963) 60 Ca1.2d 308 [32 Cal.Rptr. 825, 384 P.2d 
153J; People v. Henry (1967) 65 Cal.2d 842, 845 [56 Cal. 
Rptr. 485, 423 P.2d 557] ; Hood v. Superior C01trt (1963) 220 
Cal.App.2d 242, 247 [33 Cal.Rptr. 782]; People v. Garcia 
(1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 345 [38 Cal.Rptr. 670]; People v. 
Crll.z (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 861, 866 [40 Cal.Rptr. 841, 395 P.2d 
889] ; People v. Shelton (1964) 60 Ca1.2d 740, 744 [36 Cal. 
Rptr. 433, 388 P.2d 665]). [11] To be valid the search 
must also be "contemporaneous" or "substantially contem-
poraneous" with the arrest. (See People v. Cockrell (1965) 
63 Ca1.2d 659,666 [47 Cal.Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116] ; Agnello 
v. United States (1925) 269 U.S. 20, 30 [70 L.Ed. 145, ]48,46 
S.Ct. 4, 51 A.L.R. 409] : United States v. Rabinowitz, supra, 
339 U.S. 56, 61 [94 L.Ed. 653, 657]; Stoner v. California, 
supra, 376 U.S. 483, 486-487 [11 L.Ed.2d 856, 858-859] ; Pres-
.) 
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ton v. United States (1964) 376 U.S. 364, 367 [11 L.Ed.2d 
777.780.84 S.Ct. 881].) 
[12] A search that is substantially contt'mporalW()US with 
.arrest may precede the arrest, so long as there is probable 
cause to arrest at the outset of the search (see People v. Cock-
rell, supra, 63 Ca1.2d 659, 667; Willson \'. Superior Court 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 291,294 [294 P.2d 36]; 110ft v. Simpson 
(7th Cir. 1965) 340 F.2d 853, 856; People v. Griffin (1967) 
250 Cal.App.2d 545, 552 [58 CalRptr. 7071; People V. Torres 
(1961) 56 Cal.2d 864 [17 Cal.Rptr. 495, 366 P.2d 823] ; Peo-
ple V. Simon (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 645, 648 [290 P.2d 531]). No 
such justification exists in this ease, llOwever, for defendant 
was neit.her present nor arrested until several hours after the 
search. (See People v. Egan (1967) 250 Ca1.App.2d 433 [58 
Ca1.Rptr. 627 J ; People v. Garri.~on (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 54!) 
[11 Cal.Rptr. 398].)3 
We do not suggest that the officers in this case were moti-
vated by a reckless disregard for the rights of persons. They 
discussed the possibility of obtaining a warrant, but rejected 
it as impracticable on a Sunday night. "[I]nconvenience to 
the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers 
and present the evidence to a magistrate . . . [however] are 
never very convincing reasons ... to by-pass the constitu-
tional requirement." (Johnson v. United States, supra, 333 
U.S. 10, 15, [92 L.Ed. 436, 441].) [13] Having ascer-
tained that no one was in the apartment, the officers could not 
legally search it without a warrant. ,. There was no question 
of violence, no movable vellic1e was involved, nor was there an 
arrest or imminent destruction, removal, or concealment of the 
property intended to be seized." (United States v. Jeffers 
(1951) 342 U.S. 48,52 [96 hEd. 59,64,72 S.Ct. 93].) "They 
made no move to obtain a warrant of arrest or of search, 
although time permitted it." (People v. Egan, supra, 250 
Cal.App.2d at p. 437.) "[T]here was no probabilit.y of mate-
rial change in the situation during the time necessary to 
secure such warrant. Moreover, a short period of watching 
would have prevented any such possibility." (Taylor y. 
United States (1932) 286 U.S. 1, 6 [76 L.Ed. 951, 953, 52 
S.Ct. 466].) 
STo the extent that People v. Luna (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 493 [318 
P.2d 116]; People v. Williams (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 29 [11 Ca1.Rptr. 
43]; People V. Vice (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 269 [305 P.2d 270], and 
P(Jople V. lJominguez (1956) 144 Ca1.App.2d 63 [300 P.2d 194], are COll-
trary to our cOllcJu~iollS herein, they are disapproved. 
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We conclude that the cache of marijuana found in defend-
ant's apartment was unconstitutionally seized and was erro-
neously admitted into evidence over defendant's objection. 
Without that evidence, defendant clearly could not have been 
convicted of the charge of possession for sale. [14] More-
over, the other evidence in the case was not sufficient, in itself, 
to support the conviction of the lesser offense of possession 
from which defendant appeals. That evidence consisted solely 
of a small quantity of marijuana allegedly obtained from the 
defendant by an informant whose reliability was not estab-
lished, whose movements the officers admittedly could not 
observe without interruption, and whose information was cor-
roborated only by illegally obtained evidence. It is clear, 
therefore, that the error contributed to the conviction. (See 
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 21-24 {17 L.Ed.2d 
705, 708-710, 87 S.Ct. 824] ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal. 
2d818, 835-837 [299 P.2d 243] ; People v. Parham (1963) 60 
Ca1.2d 378,385 [33 Cal.R,ptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
MOSK, J.-I dissent. 
This court, speaking unanimously in People v. Roberts 
(1956) 47 Cal.2d 374, 380 [303 P.2d 721], concluded that the 
"fact that abuses sometinles occur during the course of crimi-
nal investigations should not give a sinister coloration to pro-
cedures which are basically reasonable." 
The majority's neat but indefensible segregation of the 
human senses-i.e., sight analysis is approved; smell and infer-
entially the other senses are rejected-results in holding the 
actions of the police here to be basically unreasonable. I would 
find the proeedures to be entirely appropriate under the exist-
ing circumstances. 
To require a police officer acting in the performance of his 
duties to totally disregard his olfactory reaction to marijuana 
-a leafy plant notorious for its identifiable odor-is utterly 
unrealistic. Equally untenable is a requirement that a war-
rant be obtained in this factual situation. As was said in 
People v. Kampmann (1968) 258 CaI.App.2d 529, 533 [65 
Cal.Rptr. 798] : "To require in the present case that one offi-
eer go to obtain a warrant while the other remains camped 
by the marijuana would further no recognizable interest; it 
would magnify technicality at the expense of reason. " 
..• ~ 
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The majority hold that "officers may rely on their sense of 
smell [only] to confirm their observation of already visible 
contra.band, " and again, that an odor cannot be deemed" the 
same as or corollary to plain view" because this might 
"open the door to snooping and rummaging through personal 
effects. " The foregoing assertion constitutes a policy declara-
tion which is totally unsupported by logic or precedent. 
Indeed, the contrary view is expressed uniformly in Califor-
nia and virtually every other American jurisdiction. Not one 
case mentioned in the majority opinion supports the proposi-
tion that officers may not rely upon the sense of smell to 
provide justification for the seizure of evidence without a 
warrant. 1 
The two California cases cited as authority for the majority 
views are People v. Foote (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 860 [24 
Cal.Rptr. 752), and People v. Chong Wing Louie (1957) 149 
Cal.App.2d 167 [307 P.2d 929]. Neither case, either in its 
facts or law, is helpful to the majority; in both, the officers 
were initially attracted to the scene through smell, and there-
after took additional steps to observe the contraband. That is 
essentially the instant circumstance. 
In People v. Foote (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 860, 862 [24 
Cal.Rptr. 752], officers stopped a suspicious motor vehicle, 
first smelled the odor of marijuana, and then when using a 
1Iashlight to further investigate actually observed the contra-
band. The conduct of the officers was deemed reasonable, the 
conviction was affirmed and this court denied a hearing. 
In People v. Chong Wing Louie (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 167, 
168 [307 P.2d 929], the officers smelled the distinctive odor of 
opium before they entered the defendant's room, and this, 
along with the subsequent confirmation by sight justified the 
seizure. Indeed, said the court (at p. 170), the prior "infor-
mation possessed by the officers before smelling opium would 
have been insufficient to justify an entry, search or arrest." 
Chong Wing Louie relied upon People v. Bock Leung Chew 
(1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 400, 402 [298 P.2d 118], in which the 
IThe majority, in their footnote 2 and throughout their opinion, fail 
to distinguish between warrantless officers breaking into premises, in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and those properly on the premises 
who fortuitously discover contraband without searching therefor. In 
Ohapman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 610 [5 L.Ed.2d 828, 81 S.Ct. 
776], the officers originally entered the premises unlawfully and in 
.A.gnello v. United States (1925) 269 U.S. 20, 31 [70 L.Ed. 145, 148, 
46 S.Ct. 4, 51 A.L.R. 409], the search was clearly invalid because it 
involved premises "several blocks distant from [the] house, where the 
arrest was made." Here the majol"ity concede the entry was lawful. 
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court grapplrd fort.hrightly wit.h our problem and reached 
this conclusion: "The basic question presented is: When i 
officers deteet the odor of a substance, the possession of which 
is made a felony, apparently coming from an apartment, does 
this justify their making an immediate entrance into and 
search of the apartment without first procuring a warrant. 
Since the possession of opium is a felony officers who detect 
the odor of opium are entitled to believe tha.t the felony of 
possessing opium is being committed in their presence. We 
ca.n see no logical distinction in this respect between some-
thing apparent to the sense of smell, and the same thing 
apparent to the sense of sight or to the sense of- hearing. " 
Again this court denied a hearing. 
Case after case is consistent with the foregoing. For further 
example, see People v. Burgess (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 36,41 
[338 P.~d 524], ill which the court held that the "term 'in 
his presence' is liberally construed [citation]. Presence is not 
mere physical proximity but whether the crime is '. . . ap-
parent to the officers' senses' [citation]. The 'senses' include 
those of hearing and smell." And in People v. Clifton (1959) 
]69 Cal.App.2d 617, 619 [337 P.2d 8711. it was held directly 
that "An officer may use his sense of smell to afford him 
knowledge that an offense is being committed in his pres-
ence. " 
The federal authorities referred to by the majority are 
inapposite to our problem: Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 
234, 236 [19 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1069, 88 S.Ct 992] [the object 
was in plain view] ; Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 305 
[thc marijuana was in waste baskets in two separate rooms] ; 
Hiet v. United States, 372 F.2d 911, 912 [the bags were in 
plain view]; Love v. United States, 170 F.2d 32, and Paper v. 
United States, 53 F.2d 184 [both involved discovery of stills; 
there was no indication of which sense was employed] ; Harris 
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 [91 L.Ed. 1399, 67 S.Ot. 1098] 
[search of drawers approved; since only draft cards were 
seized, we may assume no smell was involved]. In United 
States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 544, the officers were held 
properly on the premises as a result of using their sense of 
hearing. 
Only California v. Hurst. 325 F.2d 891, 898, and United 
States v. Vallos, 17 F.2d 390, can give some superficial solace 
to the majority, for the use of touch was there disapproved. 
But factually the cases are distinguishable for the officers felt 
leafy substances after they had already improperly seized the 
packages; they were attempting post facto justification. Such 
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procedure would be frowned upon even if sight were involved. 
Reference to People v. Bennett, 28 App.Div.2d 526 [280 
N.Y.S.2d 258, 259], gives no aid or comfort to the majority. 
To the contrary. the court there approved seizure ill the hall-
way of a suitcase from which officers detected the odor of 
narcotics. The court held tllat the proper seizure ill the hall-
way did not justify subsequent entry and search of a nearby 
apartment. 
Turning to other jurisdictions, we find universal approval 
of the doctrine that all of the human senses may be used by 
law enforcement officers and that sight alone is not the deter-
minative test in ascertaining justification for a search without 
a warrant. The leading case most frequently cited is Sp'ires Y. 
Commonwealth (1925) 207 Ky. 460 [269 S.W. 532], in which 
the court held" That an officer is not limited to information 
derived through the sense of sight, but may rely and a(:t as 
well upon information obtained through his other senses, is 
thoroughly established. . . . A little common sense added to 
the information conveyed by their senses of sight, smell and 
hearing left no rpom for reasonable doubt by the officers that 
defendant had [contraband] in his possession, and in their 
presence. ,. 
From that same jurisdiction the court in Davis v. Com-
monwealth (Ky. 1955) 280 S.W.2d 714, 716, made it clear 
that "It is not necpssary that the officer should see the con-
duct constituting the offense if the commission of the offense 
is made known to him by any of the five senses or combination 
of them. In the dark, one might be struck by an assailant 
without warning or notice so that the commission of the 
offense would be made known only by the sense of feeling. 
Likewise, th~ commission of an offense may be made knoWn by 
the sense of hearing, as in the instant case .... It is not hard 
to conceive of offenses the commission of which may be discov-
ered by use of the senses of smell and taste. " 
To the same effect is a decision in Utah Liquor Control 
Com. v. Ma1!deles (1940) 99 Utah 507 [108 P.2d 512, 513] : 
". . . if an officer becomes aware, through any of his five 
senses, of one or more details of the commission of an offense, 
and that detail or those details are of sufficient probative 
value to notify a reasonable person that an offense is being 
committed in llis presence, the officer may rely upon his 
knowledge so acquired, and without a warrant, arrest the 
offender or seize the property as the case may demand . 
• C.Id-a 
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Cases are legion upholding the usc of any of the senses by I 
law t'uforccment officers in ascertaining that there was prob-
able cause for an arrest or a search and seizure. A sense of 
smdl was involved in Massa v. State (1929) 159 Tenn. 428 
[19 S.W.2d 248,249] ; Ingle v. Commonwealth (1924) 204 Ky. 
518 [264 S.W. 1088, 1091] [in which the "atmosphere was 
loaded with the perfumes of whisky' 'J ; the sense of hearing 
was approved for an arrest or search in State v. Peters (:Mo. 
1922) 242 S.W. 894; Dilger v. Commonwealth (1889) 88 Ky. 
550 [11 S.W. 651J ; Goodwin v. Allen (1953) 89 Ga.App. 187 
[78 S.E.2d 804J; Wiggins v. State (1932) 25 Ala.App. 192 
[143 So. 188]; Faber v. State (1944) 62 Ariz. 16 [152 P.2d 
671, 673] ; State v. McAfee (1890) 107 N.C. 812 [12 S.E. 435, 
]0 IJ.It.A. 607]; any of the senses was approved in State v 
Rigsby (1942) 124 W.Va. 344 [20 S.E.2d 906] ; Romans v. 
Staie WHO) 178 ~fd. 588 [16 A.2d 642, 647J ["heard or per-
ceived by any oth~r sense"] ; State v. Lutz (1919) 85 W.Va. 
330 [101 S.E. 434J. 
Thus it seems irrefutably clear that no prevail~ng law or 
precedent supports the majority position. Reason and comm()l1 
sense also dictate a contrary conclusion. Two simple illustra-
tions will suffice to demonstrate the impracticality of limiting 
discovery of evidence to visual conception. 
Assume an officer is fired upon in a totally dark room, the 
assailant casts the weapon aside and flees. There can be no I 
doubt that the officer could search for and seize the weapon. 
The reasons relate to the use of his senses. While the room was 
dark and he could see nothing, he heard the shot, smelled the 
gunpowder, and felt the bullet graze his cheek. 
Assume an officer, in searching a closet for a fugitive, comes 
upon a corpse under a sheet. Certainly he could uncover the 
body although he originally could not see it, because he 
smelled the putrefaction and felt the shape of a body. 
The facts before us fall into the same general category as 
the foregoing hypothetical situations. The officers entered the 
apartment, properly so according to the majority, in order to 
make an arrest. They checked each room and found no one. In 
the course of searching for a person or persons, one officer 
j looked in a closet, and while so doing smelled the sweet odor 
of marijuana emanating from a package the contents of which 
he could not see without unwrapping. 
The majority seek to magnify the importance of the offi-
cer's testimony in wllich he conceded he was satisfied no one 
was in the bedroom closet before he became aware of the odor. 
) 
The officer's priorities were perfectly logical; he was search-
ing for people, not objects. But reason rebels at the insistence 
of the majority that the officer must ignore the distinctive 
aroma of contraband merely because he failed to flush out his 
human quarry and his sense of smell was aroused instead of 
bis sense of sight. 
I return, therefore, to my initial paragraph. The test, 
according to Roberts, is whether the police procedures are 
"basically reasonable." Prevailing law, and common sense, 
indicate the conduct of the officers here was entirely reason-
able. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
McComb, J., and Burke, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was df'nif'd A ugllst 
14, 1968, and the opinion was modified to read as printed 
above. McComb, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
